"It checks the enemy advance from the direction of Pamirs, holds the Baroghil pass, commands Chitral and the tribal belt between that and the northern side of the Peshawar region, threatens Jallalabad (240 miles), Kabul (315 miles) and the Oxus line of communication. It even menaces the Merv line."

Forsyth recommended the appointment of a British Agent in Gilgit. Meanwhile, the Russians had conquered Khiva in 1874 and Khokand in Ferghana in 1876, which made the British jittery about Russians and confirmed their suspicions about them as well.

The British sent Capt Biddulph for further information. He said : "The Russian frontier is Osh in Khokand. Supposing they decide to attack, then there is nothing to prevent their fully equipped army from marching up to a few miles of Surhad. No roads are necessary on the route for field artillery.

"From Surhad to the top of Ishkaman and Baroghil only one and half mile of road needs preparing for the passage of field guns and the choice of several routes were open to the invader.

"By the Baroghil pass, he can follow the course of Mastuj stream to Chitral, whence he can threaten both Jallalabad and Peshawar; or, crossing by Ishkaman pass, he can reach Gilgit in three days and from there threaten Punjab or Kashmir or Torbela route."

He admitted that preparation of roads for artillery from the passes to the plains, and vice versa, will tell both on the defenders and the attackers, but "with the possession of passes a powerful enemy can take strong initiative".

These were the reports that made the British decide to extend the border of Kashmir. As a direct involvement of the British to annex the tribal territories, in which these crucial passes lay, would entail considerable cost, both in men and material, they decided that this could "best be done" by permitting the Maharaja of Kashmir to extend his boundary, to do which he was forbidden by the British earlier, "so as to include Yassin within his territory, either by force or negotiation".

Lord Lytton, who had taken over as the new Viceroy of India in 1876, thought it would secure for the British a "vicarious but virtual" control over the tribal belt without costing much. Besides containing Russians, Lord Lytton argued, it would push the British outpost nearer Afghanistan, which country’s disintegration he was planning at that time.

But Maharaja Ranbir Singh was to extend his territories under certain specified conditions. One of which was "the location of a British officer or officers in Gilgit, or elsewhere in this territory, throughout the year and posting of the British troops at the discretion of the British". To achieve this aim, Lord Lytton met the Maharaja twice on November 17 and 18, 1876, in Madhopur.

In the first meeting, after appraising the Maharaja of the prevailing political situation in Europe and on the Asian side, Lord Lytton tried to probe the Maharaja’s mind. He found to his astonishment that Ranbir Singh’s foresight matched, if not excelled, top of the British minds. The Maharaja suggested, on Lord Lytton’s asking how to annex the Yassin area, that they could either take advantage of tribals’ internecine disputes, or have political control through negotiations, or annex the territory by force. Lord Lytton favoured the second alternative and promised all the British help necessary - also a consignment of rifles was to be presented to the Maharaja as gift.

The Maharaja was willing to do whatever the British wished. But when Lord Lytton broached the subject of posting an agent in Gilgit for quick and critical analysis of the situation on the birder, the Maharaja said it was not necessary, as with the extension of telegraph line to Gilgit, the British could get constant and immediate information regarding the frontier. But the Viceroy insisted to have an agent and the Maharaja had to relent. He asked for a day’s time to consult his councillors and think.

Meanwhile, one Edward E. Meakin (Meagan?), believed to be a journalist, met Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and later gave an account of the Maharaja’s foresight. In that interview, whereas Meakin assured the help of British Press to the Maharaja, if the Crown crossed its limits, the Maharaja compared himself to the buffer between the railway compartments.

The Maharaja said on his one side there was "the huge British train" and whenever it pushed northwards, it tilted up against him, On the other side was the shaky concern of Afghanistan and the ponderous train called Russia, Every now and again the Russian train tilted towards Afghanistan and the great engine at Calcutta (then the seat of the British Empire in India) tilted upward and the Maharaja felt like a "buffer" between them. He said some day - perhaps long after he died - both the trains will collide and he or his descendants shall lay buried in the wreck.